Conscious and unconscious context-specific cognitive control by Schouppe, Nathalie et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 04 June 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00539
Conscious and unconscious context-specific cognitive
control
Nathalie Schouppe*, Evelien de Ferrerre, FilipVan Opstal, Senne Braem andWim Notebaert
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Edited by:






Miriam Gade, University of Zurich,
Switzerland
Luis J. Fuentes, Universidad de
Murcia, Spain
*Correspondence:
Nathalie Schouppe, Department of
Experimental Psychology, Ghent
University, Henri Dunantlaan 2,
B– 9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: nathalie.schouppe@ugent.be
A key feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to deal with an ever-changing
environment. One prototypical example is the observation that we adjust our information
processing depending on the conflict-likelihood of a context (context-specific proportion
congruency effect, CSPC, Crump et al., 2006). Recently, empirical studies started to
question the role of consciousness in these strategic adaptation processes (for reviews,
see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde et al., 2012). However, these studies
have not yielded unequivocal results (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Heinemann et al., 2009; Van Gaal
et al., 2010a; Desender et al., 2013; Reuss et al., 2014). In the present study, we aim at
replicating the experiment of Heinemann et al. (2009) in which the proportion of congruent
and incongruent trials between different contextswas varied in amasked priming task.Their
results showed a reduction of the congruency effect for the context with more incongruent
trials. However, this CSPC effect was only observed when the prime–target conflict was
conscious, rather than unconscious, suggesting that context-specific control operates
within the boundaries of awareness. Our replication attempt however contrasts these
findings. In the first experiment we found no evidence for a CSPC effect in reaction times
(RTs), neither in the conscious nor in the unconscious condition.The error rate analysis did
show a CSPC effect, albeit not onemodulated by consciousness. In the second experiment
we found an overall CSPC effect in RTs, independent of consciousness.The error rates did
not display a CSPC pattern.Thesemixed results seem to nuance the findings of Heinemann
et al. (2009) and highlight the need for replication studies in psychology research.
Keywords: masked priming, consciousness, cognitive control, CSPC effect, context
INTRODUCTION
The role of consciousness is a hotly debated topic in cognitive
psychology. While it is now firmly established that unconscious
stimuli can be processed up to a semantic level (Greenwald
et al., 1996; Dehaene et al., 1998; Van den Bussche et al., 2009),
it remains a matter of debate whether unconscious stimuli can
also influence other higher order cognitive functions, such as
cognitive control and decision making. Some researchers have
claimed that this cannot be the case, stating that “it should be
impossible for an unconscious stimulus to modify processing
on a trial-by-trial basis through top-down control” (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001, p. 21; for reviews see Hommel, 2007;
Kunde et al., 2012; Van Gaal et al., 2012). Yet, several empirical
findings challenge this idea, showing how unconscious stimuli
can trigger inhibitory control processes (Van Gaal et al., 2009,
2010b) and lead to post-error (Hester et al., 2005; Cohen et al.,
2009) and post-conflict (Van Gaal et al., 2010a; Desender et al.,
2013) behavioral adjustments. The evidence is however far from
unequivocal, highlighting the need to replicate some of the initial
studies.
In what follows, we will specifically focus on adaptations
to (unconscious) conflict as an instance of cognitive control.
We will review studies questioning whether these conflict-driven
adjustments can occur with or without awareness. However,
these studies on unconscious conflict adaptation all have one
potential drawback, namely that the effect under investigation
can also be explained by simple episodic memory learning pro-
cesses (Hommel, 1998; Schmidt and Besner, 2008; Schmidt, 2013),
without cognitive control meddling in (but see Duthoo and
Notebaert, 2012). In other words, we can question whether the
results reflect unconscious implementation of control processes
or episodic learning processes. One study on cognitive control
and consciousness partly addressed this issue such that one par-
ticular explanation in terms of event learning could be ruled out
(Heinemann et al., 2009; see also Crump andMilliken, 2009). This
study of Heinemann et al. (2009) will be the focus of the present
replication study.
CONFLICT PROCESSING AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
In the laboratory, cognitive control processes are typically inves-
tigated by means of interference tasks. These tasks all have in
common that they require responding to a task-relevant stimulus,
while simultaneously ignoring irrelevant, competing information.
In a number priming task for instance, participants are asked to
respond to a target number (e.g., indicate whether the number is
smaller or larger than 5) while ignoring a prime number, which is
presented briefly before the target. The design of this task implies a
distinction between congruent and incongruent trials. The former
trial type consists of trials where both prime and target activate
the same response (e.g., “2” as the prime and “4” as the target),
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whereas the latter is composed of those trials where prime and tar-
get activate a different response (e.g., “2” as the prime and “8” as
the target). Not surprisingly, incongruent trials lead to slower and
more error-prone responses compared to congruent trials (i.e.,
congruency effect).
Importantly however, it has been shown that participants can
adapt to the conflict elicited by incongruent trials. For instance,
it is a well-known observation that the congruency effect can be
modulated on a trial-by-trial basis, with a smaller congruency
effect following an incongruent trial, relative to a previous con-
gruent trial (i.e., congruency sequence effect, for a review, see
Egner, 2007). Also, when varying the proportion of congruent and
incongruent trials in different contexts, it has been shown that the
congruency effect is reduced in a context signaling a high degree of
conflict (i.e., context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC
effect, for a review, see Bugg and Crump, 2012). These effects
have typically been explained as reflecting a strategic up-regulation
of cognitive control after the occurrence of conflict (Botvinick
et al., 2001), leading to better task performance after previous
incongruent trials (i.e., congruency sequence effect) and in a
context with a high proportion of incongruent trials (i.e., CSPC
effect).
However, alternative explanations for these effects in terms
of lower level episodic learning processes have been put forward
(Hommel, 1998; Mayr et al., 2003; Schmidt, 2013). For instance,
Hommel (1998) explained the congruency sequence effect by
claiming that stimulus and response features of a particular trial
are bound in an episodic memory code, leading to faster responses
on the next trial when all features completely repeat or alternate,
than when there is only a partial repetition/alternation of features.
Similarly, it has been suggested that in contexts with a high pro-
portion of (in)congruent trials, the frequent occurrence of specific
stimulus–response–context combinations leads to increased event
binding and hence modulations of the congruency effect. Several
studies however showed that the congruency sequence effect per-
sists after excluding all feature repetitions (Notebaert andVerguts,
2007; Duthoo and Notebaert, 2012), and that the CSPC effect is
still present on trials for which the specific prime–target–context
combinations are equally frequent in both contexts (Crump and
Milliken, 2009).
Unfortunately, controlling for these alternative accounts is not
yet common practice in research on the consciousness-control
link. This puts into question whether some studies truly inves-
tigate the role of consciousness in cognitive control, since an
interpretation in terms of event learning is often not excluded.
For the present research, it is especially important to rule out
these episodic learning accounts because most consciousness
theories agree on the idea that low-level bottom-up learn-
ing mechanisms as described by Hommel (1998) and Schmidt
(2013) do not require consciousness. Therefore, by controlling
for these bottom-up explanations, we can investigate a “puri-
fied” indexation of top-down cognitive control. This is crucial,
because, while agreeing on the idea that the abovementioned
episodic learning effects can work unconsciously, conscious-
ness theories differ in their predictions for cognitive control.
The global neuronal workspace (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001)
for example would argue that consciousness is a prerequisite for
frontal lobe processes, such as top-down control. Other the-
ories (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) refrain from tying
consciousness to the frontal cortex (and hence to cognitive
control).
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
Until now, several studies have investigated whether participants
can adjust their performance after unconscious conflict (for a
review, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012), yet the find-
ings are mixed. In the study of Kunde (2003), participants had to
indicate the direction of a target arrow, which was preceded by
a smaller prime arrow, that could either match (congruent trial)
or mismatch (incongruent trial) with the direction of the target.
Importantly, the prime arrow could fit into the contour of the tar-
get arrow such that it was rendered invisible when prime and target
were presented in rapid succession (i.e., meta-contrast mask).
Kunde (2003) observed a typical congruency sequence effect when
the prime was consciously perceived. However, this effect disap-
peared when the prime was invisible, suggesting that cognitive
control adjustments could only be implemented when the conflict
was consciously visible. Ansorge et al. (2011) and Frings andWen-
tura (2008) came to the same conclusion using different conflict
tasks and masking procedures. In these studies, the congruency
sequence effect was also only evident when the primes were
visible.
In contrast to these studies, Van Gaal et al. (2010a) could
provide evidence for an unconsciously triggered congruency
sequence effect. Their experiment was identical to Kunde (2003),
except for two modifications. They shortened the intertrial-
interval and removed the auditory signal that Kunde (2003)
presented before each trial. Van Gaal et al. (2010a) showed that
even after unconsciously perceived conflict, participants adjusted
their performance, leading to a smaller congruency effect after
unconscious incongruent trials compared to unconscious con-
gruent trials. Desender et al. (2013) now also replicated this
finding, thereby arguing that cognitive control does not require
consciousness.
However, as argued above, the congruency sequence effect can
be explained – albeit not exclusively – by other accounts, for which
these studies did not control. Only one study on cognitive con-
trol and consciousness took this into consideration, providing
a first attempt to differentiate between a cognitive control and
event learning account. More specifically, the study of Heine-
mann et al. (2009) used a context-specific proportion congruency
manipulation to investigate whether cognitive control operates
within the boundaries of awareness. In their study, participants
had to judge the magnitude of a target number that was pre-
ceded by a prime number that could either facilitate or interfere
with the target response. This priming task was embedded in
two contexts, with one context containing 80% congruent and
20% incongruent prime–target combinations (low-conflict con-
text), and the other context consisting of 20% congruent and
80% incongruent prime–target combinations (high-conflict con-
text). In the first experiment, the prime numbers were clearly
visible to the participants, whereas in the second experiment
the prime numbers were heavily masked, such that the conflict
between prime and target responses was unconscious. Crucially,
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Heinemann et al. (2009) included test trials with equal frequen-
cies in both contexts (see also Crump and Milliken, 2009).
Heinemann et al. (2009) found a CSPC effect on the test tri-
als, only in the conscious condition, and not in the unconscious
condition.
The study of Heinemann et al. (2009) is thus especially impor-
tant, since they did not find evidence for unconscious cognitive
control, while excluding an alternative interpretation in terms of
event learning processes. Moreover, given the mixed findings in
the field, replication is crucial. Unfortunately, null findings are
less likely to get published. This is also highlighted by Kunde et al.
(2012, p. 15), stating: “research on the consciousness-control link
is perhaps particularly susceptible to publication bias. Positive evi-
dence for control without awareness is exciting and may make it
easier to be published in prestigious journals (or to be published
at all), while negative evidence resides in less prestigious journals
(or may not be published).”We therefore aimed at replicating the
results of Heinemann et al. (2009), and predicted the absence of a
CSPC effect in the unconscious condition. Aswill be clear from the
description below, the first experiment is not an exact replication,
differing in some small aspects from the original study. Therefore,
we also conducted a second experiment, in which we more accu-




Forty students (M : 22.5 years of age, SD: 2.3; 26 female) from
Ghent University participated in the study. They had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants provided writ-
ten informed consent and received 24 euro in return for their
participation.
STIMULI AND MATERIAL
Participants were seated in a dimly lit, quiet room, with a view-
ing distance of approximately 60 cm from the computer screen.
Stimuli were presented on a 15-inch CRT monitor. Screen res-
olution was 1152 × 864 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz
was set. Prime stimuli consisted of the digits “2,” “3,” “7,” and
“8.” Target stimuli were the digits “‘1,” “4,” “6,” and “9.” The
same frequency of prime–target combinations was adopted as in
Heinemann et al. (2009). Inducing trials are those prime–target
combinations that are frequent in only one of the two (low-
or high-conflict) contexts. Test trials are prime–target combi-
nations that are equally frequent in the two contexts (see also
Table 1). By means of distinguishing between both trial types,
the episodic learning interpretation of the CSPC effect could be
put to the test. Pre- and post-masks were an array of four hash
(“#”) symbols. Prime, target, and mask stimuli were centrally pre-
sented in Arial font 20 on top of the context figure. This figure
was a centrally presented square of 8 cm × 8 cm that was pre-
sented in either the color cyan (RGB = 0, 255, 255) or lime
(RGB = 191, 255, 0), with the two colors denoting the differ-
ent conflict contexts. Participants’ responses were registered by
means of a cedrus response box with 4 buttons (two on each side).
Participants had to rest their middle and index finger of both
hands on the corresponding buttons. Stimulus presentation and
response registration were done using Tscope software (Stevens
et al., 2006).
PROCEDURE
The trial procedure closely resembled theprocedureof Heinemann
et al. (2009); however, stimulus presentation was synchronized
with the refresh rate of the monitor (16.67 ms), leading to small
differences with the timing reported1. Every trial started with
the presentation of the context figure and a fixation cross in
the middle of the screen. The context figure remained on the
screen until the end of the trial, the fixation cross was presented
for 700 ms. For the unconscious procedure, the fixation cross
was followed by a pre-mask (66.67 ms), a prime (33.33 ms),
a post-mask (66.67 ms) and the target (130 ms). For the con-
scious procedure, the pre-mask (66.67 ms) appeared, followed by
the prime (33.33 ms), a blank (50 ms), a post-mask (16.67 ms),
and the target (130 ms). Participants had 1000 ms to respond
to the target. Feedback was provided when participants made
an error or reacted too slow (>1000 ms). The message “Fout!”
(Dutch, meaning “Wrong!”) or “Te Traag!” (Dutch, meaning “Too
slow!”) was presented for 700 ms. The intertrial-interval was
700 ms.
The experiment consisted of two sessions that were conducted
on two consecutive days. The first session started with two train-
ing blocks of 160 trials. In a training block, only trials from the
same context (low-conflict or high-conflict) were presented. The
order of high-conflict and low-conflict training blocks was coun-
terbalanced across participants. After training, participants had
to perform five blocks in which trials from the high- and low-
conflict context were randomly intermixed (CSPC blocks). Each
of these CSPC blocks consisted of 80 trials, with 40 trials from the
high-conflict context and 40 trials from the low-conflict context.
Trials from the low-conflict context consisted of 80% congruent
trials and 20% incongruent trials. The high-conflict context had
20% congruent and 80% incongruent trials. After these CSPC
blocks, five choice blocks of 80 trials were presented in which
participants were first asked to choose between the two contexts,
after which a stimulus from the chosen context appeared. Thus,
on every trial the two contexts (two colored squares) were pre-
sented, one on the left and the other on the right side of the
screen. Participants had to indicate which context to choose by
pressing a corresponding button, after which the trial procedure
as described above started. These choice blocks were included
to see if participants developed a preference for one of the two
figures (and their associated congruency proportion), dependent
on the consciousness condition. However, because this hypothesis
lies beyond the scope of the present replication attempt, we will
report, but not elaborate on the results from these choice blocks.
Another five CSPC blocks followed the choice blocks. The second
session started with two training blocks of 160 trials. Thereafter,
1Heinemann et al. (2009) did not report which refresh rate of the monitor they
used. Please note however that the timing as reported in Heinemann et al. (2009)
is unrealistic because to our knowledge one cannot obtain a timing of 70 ms (pre-
mask), 26 ms (prime), 60 ms (blank), and 10 ms (post-mask), when stimulus
presentation is synchronized with the refresh rate of a monitor. In Experiment 1, we
unfortunately did not register the precise timing of the presentation of the target,
so that we can only report an approximate value for this presentation time.
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Table 1 | Distribution of prime–target combinations in the high- and low-conflict contexts.
Prime Target N trials in low-conflict
context
N trials in high-conflict
context
Inducing trial Test trial
2 1 7 1 X
2 4 1 1 X
2 6 1 7 X
2 9 1 1 X
3 1 1 1 X
3 4 7 1 X
3 6 1 1 X
3 9 1 7 X
7 1 1 7 X
7 4 1 1 X
7 6 7 1 X
7 9 1 1 X
8 1 1 1 X
8 4 1 7 X
8 6 1 1 X
8 9 7 1 X
Table adopted from Heinemann et al. (2009).
participants had to perform six CSPC blocks of 80 trials, followed
by four choice blocks of 80 trials and again six CSPC blocks of
80 trials. At the end of the second session, participants had to
complete a prime visibility task. The trial procedure of this prime
visibility task was exactly the same as the CSPC blocks; crucially
however, participants were instructed to respond to the prime
stimulus, instead of the target. They thus had to indicate whether
the prime was smaller or larger than five. Two blocks of 80 trials
were presented.
The assignment of context color (lime or cyan) to proportion
congruency was counterbalanced across participants. For each
participant, this assignment was held constant across sessions.
All participants used their right hand to perform the magni-
tude judgment task. They had to press the right button on the
response box with their right middle finger when the digit was
larger than five. They had to press the left button with their
right index finger when the digit was smaller than five. In the
choice blocks, participants used their left hand to make a choice.
They had to press the left button if they wanted to choose the
square presented on the left side of the screen, and the right but-
ton when choosing the square on the right side of the screen.
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the conscious
condition, the other half of the participants to the unconscious
condition.
DATA ANALYSIS
The same outlier procedure as Heinemann et al. (2009) was
used. More precisely, we excluded trials with reaction times
(RTs) < 200 ms and > 1000 ms (1%). Also, error trials (7%)
were removed from the RT analysis. Furthermore, in accor-
dance with Heinemann et al. (2009), the analysis was confined
to the test trials only. Mean RTs and error rates were submitted
to a repeated-measures ANOVA, with conflict context (high-
conflict vs. low-conflict), congruency (C vs. IC) and session (first
day vs. second day) as within-subject factors and consciousness
(unconscious vs. conscious) as between-subject factor.
RESULTS
CSPC
RTs. Reaction Time results showed a main effect of session, with
faster responses on the second day (M : 413.8 ms) than on the first
day (M : 428.8 ms), F(1,38) = 16.4, p < 0.001, η2p= 0.30. There
was also a significant interaction between session and conscious-
ness, F(1,38) = 4.3, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10, indicating that the RT
difference between the first and second sessions was larger for the
conscious group (M : 22.6 ms) than the unconscious group (M :
7.3 ms). Furthermore, a significant congruency effect of 25.2 ms
was found, F(1,38) = 88.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70, as well as
a significant interaction between congruency and consciousness
condition, F(1,38) = 44.4, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54, with partici-
pants in the unconscious condition showing a smaller [but still
significant, F(1,19) = 5.0, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.21] congruency effect
(M : 7.4 ms) compared to participants in the conscious condi-
tion (M : 43.1 ms). All other main and interaction effects were
not significant, all F’s ≤ 1.9, all p’s ≥ 0.18. Figure 1A displays
condition-dependent mean RTs for both consciousness groups
separately.
Error rates. The error rate analysis revealed a significant congru-
ency effect, F(1,38)= 39.3, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.51, indicating more
errors on incongruent trials (M : 8.0%) than on congruent trials
(M : 3.8%). There was also a marginally significant interaction
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Mean RTs for each condition, depicting the CSPC effect (calculated on the test trials only) in each session, separately for the conscious and
unconscious group and (B) mean error rates for each condition, depicting the CSPC effect (calculated on the test trials only) in each session, separately for the
conscious and unconscious group.
between congruency and consciousness, F(1,38)= 3.0, p= 0.092,
η2p= 0.07, indicating a slightly larger congruency effect in the con-
scious group (M : 5.3%), compared to the unconscious group (M :
3.0%). Moreover, a significant interaction between congruency
and conflict context (i.e., CSPC effect) was found, F(1,38) = 5.4,
p < .005, η2p = 0.13, indicating a larger congruency effect in the
low-conflict context (M : 4.9%) than in the high-conflict context
(M : 3.5%). All other main and interaction effects were not signif-
icant, all Fs ≤ 2.0, p ≥ 0.17. Figure 1B depicts mean error rates
for each within-subjects condition, for both consciousness groups
separately.
Follow-up analyses
When analyzing the data from the test trials only, we could not
replicate the results of Heinemann et al. (2009). To follow-up,
we also reanalyzed the data with both inducing and test trials
included. A repeated-measures ANOVAwas carried out, with con-
flict context (high-conflict vs. low-conflict), congruency (C vs.
IC), session (first day vs. second day) and trial type (inducing vs.
test) as within-subject factrs and consciousness (unconscious vs.
conscious) as between-subjects factor.
RTs. The RT analysis showed a significant main effect of trial type,
F(1,38) = 22.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37, indicating faster responses
on inducing trials (M : 416.2 ms) than on test trials (M : 421.3 ms).
Furthermore, a main effect of session was found, F(1,38) = 20.4,
p< 0.001,η2p= 0.35, showing that participants responded faster in
the second (M : 411.3) compared to the first session (M : 426.1ms).
Moreover, this difference between sessions was more pronounced
for the conscious group (M : 21.8 ms) compared to the uncon-
scious group (M : 7.6 ms), F(1,38) = 4.7, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.11.
Results also showed a significant congruency effect (M : 28.4 ms),
F(1,38)= 134.0, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.78, and an interaction between
congruency and trial type, F(1,38) = 8.7, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.19.
This interaction indicated a larger congruency effect on induc-
ing trials (M : 31.5 ms) compared to test trials (M : 25.2 ms).
Importantly, the congruency effect was also modulated by con-
sciousness, F(1,38)= 60.9, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.62, with participants
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in the conscious group showing a larger congruency effect than
the participants in the unconscious group (M: 47.5 ms vs. M:
9.3 ms). Finally a marginally significant interaction between con-
flict context and consciousness was found, F(1,38)= 3.6, p= 0.06,
η2p = 0.08. Participants in the conscious group showed faster
responses in the high-conflict context (M : 426.3 ms) than in the
low-conflict context (M : 427.9 ms). This was reversed for partic-
ipants in the unconscious group (M: 411.0 ms vs. M: 409.6 ms).
All other main and interaction effects were not significant, all
F’s ≤ 2.8, p’s ≥ 0.11.
Error rates. Results from the error rate analysis showed a signifi-
cant congruency effect,F(1,38)= 38.4,p< 0.001,η2p= 0.50,which
was furthermore modulated by consciousness, F(1,38) = 7.5,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.16. Specifically, the unconscious group displayed
a smaller congruency effect (M : 2.2%), than the conscious group
(M : 5.5%). Furthermore, an interaction between session and con-
flict context was found, F(1,38) = 7.6, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.17,
indicating that more errors were made in the low-conflict con-
text (M : 6.3%) compared to the high-conflict context (M : 5.8%)
in session 1. However, in session 2 this difference between con-
flict contexts was reversed, with more errors in the high-conflict
context (M : 6.1%) compared to the low-conflict context (M :
5.3%).
Results furthermore showed a three-way interaction between
trial type, congruency and consciousness, F(1,38)= 5.0, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.12, indicating that the congruency effect was larger on
test trials (M : 3.0%) compared to inducing trials (M : 1.3%) for
the unconscious group, F(1,19) = 6.1, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.2. In
contrast, this difference in congruency effect between trial types
was negligible for the conscious group, F < 1.0 (M test: 5.3%;
M inducing: 5.7%). Also, an interaction among trial type, con-
flict context, and congruency was found, F(1,38) = 4.3, p < .05,
η2p = .10. This three-way interaction indicated that on test tri-
als there was a significant CSPC effect (M : 1.4%), F(1,38) = 5.4,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.1. On inducing trials, this CSPC effect how-
ever vanished, F < 1.0 (M : –0.2%). Furthermore, results also
showed an interaction among trial type, conflict context, and
consciousness, F(1,38) = 4.7, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.11. For the con-
scious group, there were more errors in the low-conflict context
(M : 6.2%) compared to the high-conflict context (M : 5.5%) on
inducing trials. On test trials, this difference between contexts
was reversed (M low-conflict: 5.8%; Mhigh-conflict: 6.4%). For the
unconscious group, the difference between contexts on test tri-
als was negligible (M low-conflict: 5.9%; Mhigh-conflict: 5.8%). On
inducing trials however, there were more errors in the high-
conflict context (M : 6.2%) compared to the low-conflict context
(M: 5.3%).
Finally, two marginally significant interactions were found.
Namely, results showed amarginally significant interaction among
trial type, session, and congruency, F(1,38) = 3.3, p = 0.08,
η2p = 0.08, indicating that the congruency effect was smaller on
inducing trials (M : 2.7%) compared to test trials (M : 4.2%) in the
second session, while in the first session this difference was neg-
ligible (M test: 4.0%; M inducing: 4.4%). Furthermore, a marginally
significant four-way interaction among conflict context, con-
gruency, session, and consciousness was found, F(1,38) = 3.8,
p = 0.06, η2p = 0.09. This interaction indicated that for the
conscious group, the CSPC effect was larger in the first session
(M : 2.9%), compared to the second session (M : –1.4%). For
the unconscious group, there was no difference in CSPC effect
between sessions (Msession1: 2.0%; Msession2: 2.4%). All other
main and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s ≤ 2.8,
p’s ≥ 0.10.
Prime visibility
The signal detection measure (d′) was calculated for the conscious
and unconscious group. Trials with primes smaller than 5 were
considered signal, trials with primes larger than 5 were consid-
ered noise. Only trials with RTs ranging from 200 to 1000 ms were
included. Mean prime visibility was 2.4 (SD: 1.6) for the conscious
group, which differed significantly from 0, t(19)= 6.7, p< 0.001,
d= 1.49. For the unconscious group,mean prime visibility was 0.4
(SD: 0.5), also deviating significantly from 0, t(19)= 3.6, p< 0.01,
d = 0.81. Importantly, prime visibility was smaller in the uncon-
scious group compared to the conscious group, t(23.2) = 5.2,
p < 0.001, d = 1.68.
In a next step, we tested for the unconscious group whether
there is a congruency effect when prime visibility (d′) is 0 (Draine
and Greenwald, 1998). Therefore, we conducted a regression
analysis, in which we regressed participants’ congruency effects
onto the d′ values. Congruency effects were calculated with the
following formula (cfr. Heinemann et al., 2009): 100∗ (mean
RT incongruent–mean RT congruent)/mean RT congruent. The
results showed a non-significant intercept, t(19) = 1.5, p = 0.16,
R2 = 0.09, suggesting that with no prime visibility (d′ = 0), there
is no evidence for a congruency effect. Moreover, the slope was not
significant, t(19) = 1.3, p = 0.20, R2 = 0.09, indicating that there
was no correlation between prime visibility and the congruency
effect.
Choice results
Participants in the conscious group chose the low-conflict context
in 63.1% of the cases (SD: 22.2%). This mean low-conflict choice
rate differed significantly from chance, t(19) = 2.6, p < 0.05,
d = 0.59, and furthermore did not differ across the two sessions,
t < 1. For the unconscious group, mean choice rate for the low-
conflict context was 58.1% (SD: 19.7%), which differedmarginally
significant from chance, t(19) = 1.8, p = 0.08, d = 0.41. Again,
no effect of session on low-conflict choice rates was found, t < 1.
Importantly, the two groups did not differ significantly in mean
choice rate for the low-conflict context, t < 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
We could not replicate Heinemann et al.’s (2009) findings, in the
sense that we did not find any evidence for a modulation of the
size of the CSPC effect by consciousness, neither when consider-
ing only the test trials nor when considering all trials. Moreover,
for the conscious condition we could not even demonstrate a
CSPC effect in RTs, thereby failing to demonstrate the presence of
the effect under investigation, and thereby failing to replicate the
results of the original studies of Crump et al. (2006) and Crump
and Milliken (2009). Importantly however, it should be noted
that our experiment showed several discrepancis with Heinemann
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et al.’s (2009) study, thereby raising some concerns that should
be addressed in a follow-up experiment before we can support
the claim that context-specific control does (or does not) require
consciousness.
First, the percentage of errors in the study of Heinemann
et al. (2009; 32.9%) was substantially higher than the percent-
age obtained in our study. This discrepancy may have been caused
by the difference in response deadline used. In the study of Heine-
mann et al. (2009) a very stringent response deadline (250ms after
target offset) was imposed, while our response deadline was set to
1000 ms. In the follow-up experiment, we opted for the same
deadline procedure as Heinemann et al. (2009).
Moreover, in our experiment choice blocks were included in
both sessions in which participants had to choose between the
two contexts before proceeding to the magnitude judgment task.
These choice blocks were included for reasons discussed elsewhere
(Schouppe et al., 2014) and do not form the focus of attention
in this replication study. However, one can argue that the inclu-
sion of these choice blocks did interfere with our CSPC measure.
Although follow-up analyses in which we compared the CSPC
effect before and after the choice blocks do not suggest this to
be the case, in Experiment 2 we strictly followed the procedure
outlined in Heinemann et al. (2009) and thus removed the choice
blocks.
Finally, the results of the prime visibility task of Experiment 1
suggested that the primes were still perceived at some level of con-
sciousness (d′ was not equal to zero). It is noteworthy however,
that also in the studies of Heinemann et al. (2009) the primes were
not fully invisible in the unconscious condition (i.e., d′ = 0.79,
differing significantly from zero, t(15) = 6.43, p < 0.001). We
however have to acknowledge that our masking procedure was
not optimal, since it did not fully prevent prime visibility. We
therefore opted for a more stringent masking procedure in Exper-




Sixty-six students2 (M : 19.4 years of age, SD: 3.6; 60 female)
from Ghent University participated in the study in return for
course credits. All participants were right-handed and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. They provided written informed
consent.
STIMULI AND MATERIAL
A 19-inch CRT monitor was used with a refresh rate set to 75 Hz.
Prime stimuli consisted of the digits “2,” “3,” “7,” and “8.” Target
stimuli were the digits “1,” “4,” “6,” and “9.” The same frequency
of prime–target combinations was adopted as Experiment 1 (see
also Table 1). Pre- and post-masks were arrays of three symbols,
2Based on the original dataset of Heinemann et al. (2009), we calculated the number
of participants needed to achieve 95%power (givenα=0.05) for thebetween-subject
comparison of the CSPC effect (conscious vs. unconscious). More specifically, in
Heinemann’s study, the CSPC effect differed significantly between the conscious and
unconscious group, t(27) = 2.5, p < 0.05, d = 0.91. Based on this Cohen’s d effect
size, we calculated using G-Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007) that 36 participants had to be
tested to achieve 95% power.
randomly chosen without replacement from the following set of
symbols: “%.” “?,” “&,” “§,” “β,” and “#.” Prime, target, and mask
stimuli were centrally presented in Arial font 20 on top of the
context figure. This figure was a centrally presented rectangle of
9 cm (w) × 7 cm (h) that was presented in either the color cyan
(RGB= 0, 255, 255) or lime (RGB= 0, 255, 0), with the two colors
denoting the different conflict contexts. Participants’ responses
were registered using a standard keyboard. Participants were asked
to rest their left and right index finger on the “F” and “J” keys
respectively. Stimulus presentation and response registration were
done using E-Prime (Schneider et al., 2002).
PROCEDURE
Experiment 2 was set up as an exact replication of Heinemann
et al. (2009). The trial procedure was therefore identical, besides
very small differences in timing1. Every trial started with the pre-
sentation of the context figure and a fixation cross in the middle
of the screen. The context figure remained on the screen until the
end of the trial, the fixation cross was presented for 700ms. For the
unconscious procedure, the fixation cross was followed by a pre-
mask (66.67ms), a prime (26.67ms), a post-mask (66.67ms), and
the target (146.67 ms). For the conscious procedure, the pre-mask
(66.67 ms) appeared, followed by the prime (26.67 ms), a blank
(53.33 ms), a post-mask (13.33 ms), and the target (146.67 ms).
Participants had 250 ms to respond after target offset. A blank
screen that lasted until a response was given, or until a time win-
dow of 1000 ms was exceeded, followed the target. Feedback was
provided when participants made an error or reacted too slow.
The message “Fout!” (Dutch, meaning “Wrong!”) was presented
for 700 ms after a erroneous response was registered. The mes-
sage “Te Traag!” (Dutch, meaning “Too slow!”) was presented
for 700 ms when the time window of 250 ms after target off-
set was exceeded. Yet, responses after this time interval, were
still registered with a deadline of 1000 ms. The intertrial-interval
was 700 ms.
The experiment consisted of two sessions. The second ses-
sion was always conducted 3 days after the first. Both sessions
started with two training blocks of 160 trials (one of each con-
flict context). The first session consisted of five CSPC blocks of
80 trials. The second session consisted of six CSPC blocks of 80
trials and was furthermore concluded with two prime visibility
blocks of 64 trials. In the training blocks, only trials from the
same context (low-conflict or high-conflict) were presented. The
order of high-conflict and low-conflict training blocks was coun-
terbalanced across participants. Each CSPC block contained 40
trials from the high-conflict context and 40 trials from the low-
conflict context. Trials from the low-conflict context consisted
of 80% congruent trials and 20% incongruent trials. The high-
conflict context contained 20% congruent and 80% incongruent
trials.
The assignment of context color (lime or cyan) to proportion
congruency was counterbalanced across participants. For each
participant, this assignmentwas held constant across sessions. Par-
ticipants had to press the“J”keywhen the digit was larger than five,
and the “F” key when the digit was smaller than five. Half of the
participants were randomly assigned to the conscious condition,
the other half of the participants to the unconscious condition.
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DATA ANALYSIS
For the analysis of the CSPC effect, outlier trials < 200 ms
and > 1000 ms were excluded (18% of all trials; 10% errors and
8% correct trials). For the RT analysis erroneous responses (38%
of all trials) were also removed. Mean RTs and error rates were
submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA, with conflict context
(high-conflict vs. low-conflict), congruency (C vs. IC) and session
(first day vs. second day) as within-subject factors and conscious-
ness (unconscious vs. conscious) as a between-subject factor. We
first specifically focused on the test trials, however, a follow-up
analysis with trial type (inducing vs. test) as an extra within-
subjects factor was also carried out. Moreover, Heinemann et al.
(2009) reported an RT analysis that included correct trials after the
response deadline, stating that “the data pattern did not change
substantially when excluding these responses” (p. 969). To check
whether this was also the case in our study, we additionally ana-
lyzed the data including only trials with response times between




RTs correct test trials with RTs > 200 ms. Figure 2A displays the
mean RTs for each condition. The analysis showed a main effect
of session, F(1,64) = 7.9, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.11, indicating slower
RTs in the first (M : 336.4 ms) compared to the second session
(M : 324.6 ms). Also, a significant congruency effect of 16.1 ms
was found, F(1,64) = 20.9, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25, which was
more pronounced in the conscious (M : 23.6 ms) compared to the
unconscious group (M : 8.7ms),F(1,64)= 4.4, p< 0.05,η2p= 0.07.
Importantly, a significant conflict context × congruency interac-
tion was found, F(1,64) = 4.5, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.07, reflecting a
larger congruency effect in the low-conflict context (M : 20.7 ms)
compared to the high-conflict context (M : 11.6 ms). This over-
all CSPC effect was not modulated by consciousness, F < 1.0.
All other main and interaction effects were not significant, all
F’s ≤ 1.1, all p’s ≥ .29. Extra analyses conducted separately for
the two consciousness groups showed that the CSPC effect was
significant in the unconscious group (M : 8.0 ms), F(1,32) = 4.5,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.12, but not in the conscious group (M : 10.0 ms),
F(1,32)= 1.7, p > 0.1, η2p = 0.05.
RTs correct test trials with RTs > 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms.How-
ever, the result patternwas different when only considering correct
trials between 200 and 380 ms. The 2 (session) × 2 (conflict con-
text) × 2 (congruency) × 2 (consciousness) repeated-measures
ANOVA then revealed a marginally significant main effect of con-
flict context, F(1,64) = 3.8, p = 0.06, η2p = 0.06, with larger
RTs for the high-conflict (M : 294.4 ms) compared to the low-
conflict context (M : 291.2 ms). Moreover, this effect of conflict
context was modulated by consciousness, F(1,64)= 6.0, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.09, with participants in the conscious group showing
a larger effect of conflict context (M : 7.1 ms), than partici-
pants in the unconscious group (M : –0.8 ms). Furthermore, a
marginally significant interaction between conflict context and
session was found, F(1,64) = 3.4, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.05, as well
as a marginally significant interaction among conflict context,
congruency and session, F(1,64) = 3.4, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.05. This
three-way interaction reflects a reversed CSPC effect of –6.9 ms
in the first session, and a normal CSPC effect of 7.4 ms in
the second session. All other main and interaction effects were
not significant, all F’s ≤ 2.5, all p’s ≥ 0.12. Extra analyses for
the conscious and unconscious group separately showed nei-
ther a significant CSPC effect nor an interaction between the
CSPC effect and session, for either group, all F’s ≤ 2.1, all
p’s ≥ 0.16.
Error rates test trials with RTs> 200. Figure 2B displays themean
error rates for each condition of interest. The error rate analysis
showed a significant congruency effect of 13.2%, F(1,64) = 71.0,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53, which was furthermore influenced by con-
sciousness, F(1,64) = 18.1, p < .001, η2p = 0.22. As in RTs, the
unconscious group displayed a smaller congruency effect than the
conscious group (M : 6.5%vs.M:19.9%). Furthermore, an interac-
tion between session and consciousness was found, F(1,64)= 5.7,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.08, indicating that participants in the conscious
group made less errors in the second (M : 33.8%) compared to
the first session (M : 37.0%). In the unconscious group this pat-
tern however reversed, with more errors in the second (M : 34.5%)
compared the first session (M : 32.8%). All other main and inter-
action effects were not significant, all F’s ≤ 1.8, all p’s ≥ 0.18.
Extra analyses on the two consciousness groups separately showed
no sign of an interaction between conflict context and congru-
ency, or of an interaction between session, conflict context and
congruency, all F’s< 1.
Error rates test trials with RTs > 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms. In
a next step, we also analyzed the accuracy scores of trials with
RTs> 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms and found similar results.
Follow-up analyses
As in Experiment 1, we also conducted follow-up analyses where a
repeated-measuresANOVAwas carried out onRTs and error rates,
with conflict context (high-conflict vs. low-conflict), congruency
(Cvs. IC), session (first day vs. secondday) and trial type (inducing
vs. test) as within-subject factors and consciousness (unconscious
vs. conscious) as between-subjects factor.
RTs correct trials with RT> 200 ms. Results again showed a main
effect of session, F(1,64) = 12.9, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.17, indi-
cating faster RTs in the second (M : 324.0 ms) compared to the
first session (M : 335.7 ms). Also, a main effect of congruency
was found, F(1,64) = 52.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.45, with congru-
ent trials (M : 322.0 ms) responded to faster than incongruent
trials (M : 337.7 ms). This congruency effect was larger in the con-
scious group (M : 21.9 ms), compared to the unconscious group
(M : 9.5 ms), F(1,64) = 8.2, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.11. Furthermore, a
significant interaction between trial type and consciousness was
found, F(1,64) = 6.6, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.09. Participants in the
conscious group responded faster to inducing trials (M : 327.1 ms)
compared to test trials (M : 332.3 ms). In contrast, participants
in the unconscious group were faster on test trials (M : 328.7 ms)
than on inducing trials (M : 331.4 ms). Also, the results showed
a marginally significant interaction between session, conscious-
ness and conflict context, F(1,64) = 3.1, p = 0.09, η2p = 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean RTs for each condition, depicting the CSPC effect (calculated on the test trials only) in each session, separately for the conscious and
unconscious group and (B) mean error rates for each condition, depicting the CSPC effect (calculated on the test trials only) in each session, separately for the
conscious and unconscious group.
Finally, a three-way interaction among trial type, conflict con-
text, and congruency, F(1,64) = 4.0, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.06, was
found, indicating a larger CSPC effect for test trials (M : 9.0 ms),
compared to the inducing trials (M : –2.9 ms). All other main
and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s ≤ 2.2, all
p’s ≥ 0.15.
RTs correct trials with RTs > 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms.A dif-
ferent result pattern emerged when analyzing only trials with
RTs > 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms. One participant was excluded
due to a missing cell in one of the conditions. A main effect
of trial type was found, F(1,63) = 4.2, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.06,
indicating slightly faster responses on test trials (M : 293.2 ms)
compared to inducing trials (M : 295.2 ms). This effect of trial
type interacted with conflict context, F(1,63) = 9.3, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.13, in the sense that for the low-conflict context, test tri-
als (M : 291.6 ms) were faster responded to than inducing trials
(M : 296.5 ms). For the high-conflict context, this effect numer-
ically reversed (M test: 294.9 ms vs. M inducing: 293.9 ms). The
effect of trial type × conflict context was moreover more pro-
nounced in the conscious compared to the unconscious group,
and in the first compared to the second session, as indicated by the
significant three-way interactions among trial type, conflict con-
text, and consciousness on the one hand, F(1,63) = 5.9, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.09, and among trial type, conflict context, and session
on the other hand, F(1,63) = 5.1, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.08. Fur-
thermore, a significant four-way interaction among session, trial
type, conflict context, and congruency was shown, F(1,63) = 6.6,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.09. This interaction indicated that for the
test trials, the CSPC effect evolved from –3.8 ms to 8.6 ms
over the two sessions. For the inducing trials this trend was
reversed, with a CSPC effect of 8.6 ms in session 1 and a CSPC
effect of 0.1 ms in session 2. Finally, the results showed three
marginally significant interactions. An interaction between ses-
sion and consciousness was found, F(1,63) = 3.7, p = 0.06,
η2p = 0.06, showing that for the conscious group there was no
difference in RTs between both sessions (Mfirst session: 291.1 ms
vs. Msecond session: 291.7 ms). For the unconscious group, par-
ticipants responded slower in the first (M : 300.6 ms) compared
to the second session (M : 293.5 ms). Also, the results showed a
marginally significant interaction between trial type and congru-
ency, F(1,63) = 3.4, p = 0.07, η2p = 0.05, indicating a smaller
congruency effect on test trials (M : 0.0 ms) compared to induc-
ing trials (M : 3.5 ms). Finally, a marginally significant interaction
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between conflict context and congruency, F(1,63)= 2.8, p= 0.10,
η2p = 0.04, denoted a (small) CSPC effect of 3.0 ms. All other
main and interaction effects were not significant, all F’s ≤ 2.6, all
p’s ≥ 0.11.
Errors rates trials with RTs > 200 ms.More errors were made
on incongruent (M : 41.6%) compared to congruent trials (M :
28.3%), F(1,64) = 130.1, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.67. This congruency
effect was modulated by consciousness, F(1,64)= 37.1, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.37, with a larger congruency effect in the conscious (M :
20.5%) compared to the unconscious group (M : 6.2%). Also, the
congruency effect was larger in the second (M : 14.8%) compared
to the first session (M : 12.0%), F(1,64)= 4.7, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.07.
Furthermore, an interaction between session and consciousness
was found, F(1,64) = 8.2, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.11. The conscious
group displayed more errors in the first (M : 37.4%) compared
to the second session (M : 34.5%). This effect was reversed for the
unconscious group (Mfirst session: 32.8%vs.Msecond session: 35.1%).
All other main and interaction effects were not significant, all
F’s ≤ 2.7, all p’s ≥ 0.10.
Error rates trials with RTs > 200 ms and ≤ 380 ms. The results
of this additional analysis were highly similar. We found a sig-
nificant main effect of congruency, F(1,64) = 165.5, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.72, and two significant interaction effects: congruency
× consciousness, F(1,64) = 43.2, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.4, and
session × consciousness, F(1,64) = 10.9, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.15.
A marginally significant main effect of session was also found,
F(1,64) = 3.5, p = 0.065, η2p = 0.05, as well as a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of consciousness, F(1,64) = 3.0, p = 0.09,
η2p = 0.04. All other main and interaction effects were not
significant, all F’s ≤ 2.4, all p’s ≥ 0.12.
Prime visibility
Analogously to the analysis of the CSPC effect, only trials with
RTs > 200 ms and < 1000 ms were considered for the calcula-
tion of the signal detection measure. For the conscious group, the
mean level of prime visibility (d′ value) was 0.34 (SD: 0.45), which
deviated significantly from 0, t(32) = 4.3, p < 0.001, d = 0.76.
In contrast, for the unconscious group the mean d′ value was 0.10
(SD: 0.45), which did not differ significantly from 0, t(32) = 1.2,
p > 0.1, d = .21. Importantly, the t-test comparing both groups
in terms of prime visibility was significant, t(64) = 2.2, p < 0.05,
d = 0.56.
Furthermore, we conducted a regression analysis, in which we
regressed each participants’ congruency effect of the unconscious
group (calculated as 100∗ [mean RT incongruent-mean RT con-
gruent]/meanRT congruent) onto thed’ value. The results showed
a non-significant intercept, t(31) = 1.3, p > 0.10, R2 = 0.03 sug-
gesting that with no prime visibility (d′ = 0), there is no evidence
for a congruency effect. Moreover, the slope was not significant,
t(31) = 1, p > 0.10, R2 = 0.03, indicating that there was no
correlation between prime visibility and the congruency effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The literature on consciousness and control is expanding, yet
the findings remain mixed and do not allow a comprehen-
sive conclusion. Some studies showed that cognitive control
can act subconsciously, demonstrating conflict-driven adapta-
tions to subliminally presented conflict stimuli (Van Gaal et al.,
2010a; Desender et al., 2013; Reuss et al., 2014). Others argued
the opposite, showing an absence of typical cognitive control
effects under subconscious conditions (Kunde, 2003; Frings and
Wentura, 2008; Heinemann et al., 2009; Ansorge et al., 2011).
These mixed findings can partly be explained in terms of differ-
ent control operations requiring different levels of awareness. Yet,
before coming to such a conclusion, replication studies are highly
necessary. Therefore, the aim of this study was to replicate Heine-
mann et al.’s (2009) experiment, which was the first to control
for episodic learning confounds (Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt,
2013) when studying the role of consciousness in cognitive
control.
Heinemann et al. (2009) used a masked number priming task
where two contexts denoted the relative frequency of incongru-
ent prime–target combinations. They showed that the CSPC
effect could be observed in the conscious group, but not in the
unconscious group, suggesting that cognitive control only acts
consciously. However, in two experiments with high statistical
power, we failed to reproduce these results. In Experiment 1, we
found evidence for a CSPC effect – albeit only in error rates –
that was not modulated by consciousness. Experiment 2, set
up as an exact replication of Heinemann et al. (2009) showed
an overall CSPC effect – now only in RTs – that again did not
interact with consciousness. If anything, our results indicate that
the CSPC effect does not depend on awareness, contrary to the
conclusion of Heinemann et al. (2009). This is in line with a
recent study by Reuss et al. (2014) where the visibility of primes
was manipulated in several masked priming experiments, while
the conflict context was determined by the format of either the
prime or the target. By associating the context with either prime
or target, they could furthermore investigate whether the tem-
poral proximity between context information and conflict is of
importance for unconscious cognitive control to occur. Impor-
tantly, in Experiments 1 and 2 their results showed a CSPC effect,
with visible, as well as masked primes, and when the context was
set by the format of the primes, as well as by the targets. In
Experiments 3 and 4, Reuss et al. (2014) used test and inducing
trials to exclude the event learning account. Here, they found a
CSPC effect on test trials in the unconscious condition, but only
when the context was determined by the format of the prime.
When the context was represented by the format of the target,
a CSPC effect was observed with visible but not with masked
primes.
Contrary to Reuss et al. (2014), it should be noted that in our
study the dissociation between inducing and test trials did not
turn out as expected (Crump and Milliken, 2009). Surprisingly,
in both experiments the CSPC effect was smaller, if not absent,
on the inducing trials compared to the test trials. Unfortunately,
Heinemann et al. (2009) did not report the data of inducing tri-
als, so we cannot directly compare our results. Given the lack
of a CSPC effect on inducing trials however, together with the
fact that we did not find a CSPC effect in RTs in Experiment 1,
and the disappearance of the CSPC effect in Experiment 2 when
considering only trials within the 380 ms deadline, one might
question the overall reliability and robustness of the effect under
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investigation. In the literature, CSPC effects have always been
rather small in size and some studies have reported boundary
conditions for its occurrence (Crump et al., 2006, 2008), suggest-
ing that this effectmaynot be ideally suited to investigate the role of
consciousness on cognitive control. Alternatively, one might con-
sider paradigms where episodic learning effects can be excluded
by design (without the need for inducing trials or exclusion of tri-
als afterwards). For instance, Duthoo et al. (submitted) designed
conflict paradigms in which the congruency sequence effect could
be investigated in its “pure” form, free from feature integra-
tion and contingency learning by design (see also Kim and Cho,
2014). Using such a contingency- and feature-unbiased conflict
task would enable us to investigate consciousness and cognitive
control, while effectively controlling for all alternative low-level
learning accounts, without the need to dissociate inducing and
test trials.
Finally, it is important to emphasize one critical deviation from
the results of Heinemann et al. (2009). Specifically, the differ-
ence in d′ between both conditions was much smaller in our
Experiment 2 (conscious: d′ = 0.34; unconscious: d′ = 0.098)
compared to Heinemann et al. (2009; conscious: d′ = 2.14;
unconscious: d′ = 0.79). It is possible that this similarity in
prime visibility could account for the similar CSPC results in
both consciousness conditions in Experiment 2. One could even
argue that the magnitude of the d′ measure of the conscious
condition indicates unconscious – rather than conscious – pro-
cessing of the prime, since it appears to be heavily masked. Yet,
the d′ measure differed significantly from zero in the conscious
group, while it did not deviate from zero in the unconscious
group. Also, both consciousness conditions differed significantly
in terms of d′. These results strongly support the conclusion
that primes were consciously perceived in the conscious group
and that prime visibility is not similar across both conditions.
Moreover, the results of Experiment 1 further contradict the
notion that similarity in prime visibility accounts for the simi-
lar CSPC results. Here, the prime visibility measures (conscious:
d′ = 2.4, unconscious: d′ = 0.4) were more similar to Heine-
mann et al. (2009), and we still found a CSPC effect in both
conditions.
In sum, we failed to replicate the results described by Heine-
mann et al. (2009). With some caution, our data seem to suggest
that context-specific control can operate outside the border of
awareness as we observed a CSPC effect on frequency-unbiased
test trials in both the conscious and unconscious group. How-
ever, the CSPC effect was only observable on test trials, and not
on inducing trials. We moreover failed to find a CSPC effect on
RTs in Experiment 1, and also in Experiment 2 the effect was not
observed consistently, as the results did not show a CSPC effect
when only considering trials that were responded to within the
response deadline. Based on these observations, we believe caution
is warranted when using the CSPC effect as a marker of cognitive
control.
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